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R. G. Collingwood is best known within the philosophy of art for his development of 
the so-called expressionist theory. Briefly stated, this theory regards expression as a 
necessary condition for the production of any artwork, where expression is conceived 
as a process whereby the artist transforms inchoate thoughts and feelings into some 
clarified form within a given artistic medium. My intention is not to examine the 
conception of expression itself, but instead, turn to Collingwood’s earlier distinction 
between art and craft. Here I am particularly interested in Aaron Ridley’s analysis 
which maintains that, despite a strong distinction between art and craft, 
Collingwood’s account is flexible enough to accommodate a notion of technique 
relevant to artistic production, where such technique is itself craft-like in character.1 
Though I agree with Ridley’s conclusion, I think there is room to better spell out the 
role of technique on Collingwood’s account. I shall do this by examining the 
experience of artistic practice in the cases of jazz performance and electronic music 
composition. The aim of this paper is to show that Collingwood’s account looks 
eminently applicable to these instances of art within popular culture, but more 
importantly that these cases point us to an enrichment of Collingwood’s account 
which better accommodates a notion of technique. 
                                                 
1
  It is here also helpful to note that understanding technique as ‘craft-like’ in character is faithful to 
its etymological root which is presumably from the Greek technê, generally translated as ‘skill’ or 
‘craft’. 
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I.  SETTING UP THE PROBLEM 
In his Principles of Art, Collingwood makes a distinction between art and craft in 
order to reject an instrumental view of artworks, one in which the artistic process is 
entirely conceived as a means of achieving an independently specifiable end (the 
artwork). On Collingwood’s view a work of craft is always completely explicable in 
terms of some preconceived end before its execution, yet this is not the case with 
works of art: art-proper is not to be equated with craft. Instead Collingwood presents 
the thesis that (a) art involves expression, with the qualification that (b) expression “is 
an activity to which there can be no technique”.2 On the other hand, he maintains that 
(c) technical skill is “something used in the service of art”3 (albeit with a stress that 
such skill should not be ‘identified with art’). Taken together, these claims generate 
an apparent contradiction: technique is employed in the service of art which is 
essentially characterised by an activity that cannot employ technique. While some 
early commentators suggested that Collingwood’s art-craft distinction commits us to 
denying (c), i.e., artworks can never involve technique (where technique is here 
conceived in terms of a means-end structure),4 Aaron Ridley helpfully rebuts this 
charge by claiming that 
 
Collingwood is... committed only to a negative claim: that an artist’s technique, insofar 
as it is understood instrumentally (in terms of means and ends etc.), is not the essence 
of his art. He is not committed to the silly claim that technique is irrelevant to the 
production of works of art.5 
 
Instead, Ridley suggests that the art-craft distinction is between ‘various aspects’ that 
an object may have, hence there is no contradiction in claiming that the production of 
an artwork involves technique. He bolsters his case by discussing Collingwood’s 
remarks on representational art, in which the motive to represent is regarded as 
instrumental in character, where “what makes [the object] a representation is one 
thing, what makes it a work of art is another.”6  
 
                                                 
2
  Collingwood (1938), p.111. 
3
  Ibid, p.27. 
4
  Cf.  Mounce (1991), p.11 where he claims that “having specified that the means-end relation is 
characteristic of a craft... [Collingwood] is forced to deny all trace of it in art.” 
5
  Ridley (1998), p.14. 
6
  Collingwood (1938), p.43. 
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 While Ridley helpfully points us towards a reading of Collingwood which 
accommodates technique, his distinction between the art- and craft-aspects of an 
object reveals a new problem. Insofar as technique is thought of as instrumental, the 
problem can be made clearer by asking whether we are to ignore those instrumental 
features pertaining to technique when considering the object qua artwork? Though 
Ridley’s solution allows that technique might be a necessary condition for art-
production, it seemingly fails to specify exactly what ‘service’ to art technique might 
perform; worse still, Ridley’s rigid demarcation of aspects of an object might be 
construed as rendering technique impotent to provide any such service to art. I shall 
suggest that a more fruitful development of Ridley’s analysis is to refine the 
conception of technique on offer, where we hope to elucidate the ‘service’ technique 
provides to art. 
 
II.  THE PUZZLING RELATION BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND ART 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the puzzling relation between technique 
and art is not new. Indeed, in The Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant framed this 
very problem in his discussion of genius, itself designed to resolve a tension generated 
from his positive account of fine art involving the intentional production of beautiful 
artefacts, and his claim that beauty is not a concept.7 The tension arises in Kant’s case 
because he stipulates that technique (i.e., intentional production) be employed in 
artistic production, yet also demands that a concept of ‘what is to be produced’ be 
provided which, given his claim about beauty, seems to debar technique from 
producing anything beautiful. 
Though the credence of this puzzling relation between art and technique can 
be traced to Kant, there are recent discussions of the relation between art and 
technique more pertinent to our project. For example, R. Keith Sawyer discusses the 
artist’s creative process while connecting the idea of problem-finding versus problem-
solving to Collingwood’s account. Here he understands “the creative process [as] a 
constant balance between finding a problem and solving that problem.”8 In particular, 
Sawyer uses the example of a five-hour improvisation by Picasso captured on film in 
which we see the artist work through a range of ideas, each painted over the last, only 
to finish by declaring he will have to discard the canvas. Sawyer remarks that “the 
                                                 
7
  Kant (1790). 
8
  Sawyer (2000), p.159. 
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time was not wasted – [Picasso] has discovered some new ideas, ideas that have 
emerged from his interaction with the canvas, ideas that he can use in his next 
painting.”9 Interestingly, Sawyer’s notion of ‘problem-finding’ seemingly captures 
some distinctive intermediary process between the artist’s initial confrontation with 
the canvas and the process of arriving at some choate artistic product, i.e., expression-
proper pace Collingwood. Though the relation to technique is not explicit, we can 
query this relation by asking whether such a process of ‘problem-finding’ is amenable 
to instrumental characterisation. 
Paisley Livingston also points us toward the relation between art and technique in 
his discussion of Henri Poincaré’s view of the creative process, and the relation 
between inspiration and constraints. Livingston attributes Poincaré the view that 
“creative achievements are often the product of different sorts of interacting 
psychological processes.”10 He makes further use of this model by identifying one of 
these processes as a prior commitment to a scheme of constraints which “orients the 
creative process by establishing formal as well as substantive, or content-related 
parameters, and corresponding normative expectations and conditions.”11 My 
understanding of the driving intuition behind such an account is that constraint 
functions as a catalyst for creative action, where, without it, our endeavours would be 
too ‘open-ended’. The discussion is related to technique insofar as the purposeful 
intentions involved in laying out such constraints are often thought of as instrumental, 
where one might describe their end precisely in terms of the catalytic function they 
have upon the creative process. 
Although neither Sawyer nor Livingston discuss expression, they may be 
understood as regarding some kind of creative process as a necessary condition to art-
production. Given also that, in both cases, we have queried the role of technique with 
respect to such creative processes, both discussions may prove useful ‘food for 
thought’ in refining the conception of technique on the Collingwood/Ridley account. 
Having said this, it is not clear how we are to integrate such ideas of ‘problem-
finding’ or ‘constraint’ with this account. We turn to this challenge in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
9
  Ibid, p.150. 
10
  Livingston (2009), p.131. 
11
  Ibid, p.138. 
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III.  TECHNIQUE: THE CASE OF JAZZ 
In order to develop a Collingwoodian account, we must accommodate its central 
thesis, namely that ‘art is expression’. Collingwood describes this in terms of 
expressing emotion, where he claims this emotion is not pre-conceived before 
expression, but is rather dependent upon that expression to come into existence.12 His 
further claim is that expression results in ‘a certain thing’ as opposed to description, 
for instance, which results in “a thing of a certain kind.”13 Ridley describes the latter 
claim here as a corollary to the first, and posits these claims as explanations for two 
intuitions concerning expression in artworks: that the medium of expression is 
inseparable from what is expressed, and that expression is always unique.14 The art-
craft distinction makes sense in this light since works of craft are not unique, they are 
‘things of a certain kind’, and thus different from artworks which are unique. Ridley 
helpfully relates this discussion to accounts of purposive action.15 He identifies a 
standard model of purposive action as one in which the purpose it serves can be 
specified independently of the action itself, where we note that this model describes 
what Collingwood calls craft. However, the production of art, on Collingwood’s 
account, involves another kind of purposive action in which the purpose cannot be 
independently specified. If this were not so then the clarified emotion could be 
specified independently of the act of expression, which contradicts the claim 
concerning expression’s dependence upon the medium; we also note that this grounds 
our understanding of Collingwood’s claim that expression is ‘something to which 
there can be no technique’. This is the key idea to hold sight of when extending the 
Collingwood/Ridley account: art must involve an expressive-purposive action which 
can never be reduced to some instrumental-purposive action (or set of such actions). 
Yet if this is so, how can there be an important connection between technique, itself 
instrumental or craft-like in character, and art? 
Let us begin the proposal with an example. From what has already been said we 
can see that Collingwood’s account prevents a model of artistic expression in which 
the agent fully preconceives the result before realising it. An excellent example to 
support his case is that of musical improvisation which, by definition, can never be 
fully preconceived. We shall first focus on the example of improvisation in jazz, in 
                                                 
12
  Collingwood (1938), p.111. 
13
  Ibid, p.114. 
14
  Ridley (1998), pp.28-9. 
15
  Ibid, pp.32-3. 
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particular based on the model of a jazz standard. These standards are often presented 
in sheet music form with fairly minimal content, consisting of a chord progression and 
a melody. Such a framework can form the basis of improvisation when the performer 
spontaneously plays melodies built on the chord progressions laid out in the standard. 
The improvisation itself is by no means pre-determined by the standard, a fact that is 
evident to anyone who has heard two radically different performances based on the 
same standard. Indeed, the jazz standard is designed to facilitate the individuality and 
uniqueness of such improvisational performances. The example is interesting since 
the jazz standard serves as a catalyst for a paradigmatic case of artistic expression, 
i.e., musical improvisation, yet at the same time is itself a ‘thing of a certain kind’ 
(which gives it a craft-like complexion). The question is whether the 
Collingwood/Ridley account can help us understand how musical expression is here 
linked to the function of the jazz standard. 
On the Collingwood/Ridley account, technique is broadly construed as some kind 
of instrumental purposive action (i.e., action with a means-ends structure). We shall 
here propose to refine this conception by characterising technique as a competence 
involving medium oriented structures. The example of the jazz standard is supposed 
to exemplify the notion of a structure here insofar as it points to a framework in 
which the player can improvise, yet in no way determinately specifies the nature of 
the expression itself.  Moreover, it is plausible that we have the accommodation of 
expression as an instrumental end in mind here, since the structure helpfully 
‘constrains’ the domain in which expression is generated, rather than preconceiving it. 
By medium orientation, I mean to emphasise that the kind of structures in question are 
necessarily born out of a relationship with the medium of expression itself, where this 
relationship is logically prior to the formation of the structures themselves. By 
competence, I mean to stress a connection with the instrumental purposive actions 
pertaining to craft. In particular, the competence in question can be discussed in 
means-ends terms which are dictated to it by the pre-conceived structure to which it is 
coupled. Put another way, the competence seems to involve some theoretical 
knowledge which goes hand-in-hand with the structure. In the case of the jazz 
standard, for example, one may purposively select which scales to improvise upon 
with ‘the accommodation of expression’ as an end in mind, where this selection 
involves a judgment based on some knowledge of music theory. This notion of 
competence is somewhat clarified by intuitive appeal to the qualitative difference 
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between ‘reading’ a chord sequence in a jazz standard, which involves an almost 
mechanical improvisation that leans heavily on theoretical devices, and ‘feeling’ the 
chord sequence while improvising upon it, which involves jettisoning the theoretical 
scaffolding in the former case. We might be tempted to call the latter notion of feeling 
competence, yet this looks more like what Collingwood calls expression. In contrast, I 
want to emphasise the prior more technically constrained approach to the medium as 
that which constitutes competence. The intuition is helpful here because it indicates 
that reading and feeling should not be pulled apart, but merely seen as ends of a 
sliding scale.  
The discussion above might link up with the notions of ‘working out ideas’ and 
‘constraints’ presented earlier since, on this model of technique, the constraints are 
equated with the medium oriented structures, while the working out of ideas is based, 
initially at least, on what we might call competence. Moreover, the use of this model, 
as I understand it, is that is starts to describe the way we begin to go about artistic 
expression, and how something like technique might become the facilitator of this 
phenomena.  
We must now ask whether our refined notion of technique is compatible with the 
Collingwood/Ridley account. We identified the key claim of this account in terms of 
the irreducibility of those purposive actions distinctive of art to those constitutive of 
craft; part of the reasoning being that any such reduction would involve a relapse into 
the so-called technical theory of art. With respect to our refined notion of technique, 
the claim that technique has some catalytic function upon expression need not itself 
imply that art is reducible to technique. Indeed, the analogy to a positive catalyst in a 
chemical reaction is helpful since this merely facilitates the reaction in question, and 
remains independent of the reactants and products involved in such a reaction. In the 
same way, technique is never here regarded as constitutive of expression, but is 
nevertheless substantively connected to it. Thus the characterisation of technique 
given is seemingly compatible with the Collingwood/Ridley position. We must 
further ask whether this conception of technique elucidates the ‘service’ technique 
supposedly provides to art. In response, the proposed conception at least makes the 
broad strokes of this service a little clearer: technique is involved in providing some 
context conducive to expression.  
However, there may be a point of objection here. We recall that the proposal was 
initially arrived at by critiquing Ridley’s position on the grounds that Ridley failed to 
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do justice to a substantive connection between art and technique; a connection implied 
by Collingwood’s own admission that technique provides some ‘service’ to art. What 
is really at stake, therefore, is understanding how technique has some positive 
function on the process of expression. However, merely claiming that technique has 
some catalytic function upon expression seems only to shift the burden of 
explanation; we must now explain how this catalytic function works. Admittedly then, 
in the face of the sceptic, we have merely refined the Collingwood/Ridley position to 
the extent that it looks ‘more plausible’ to posit a substantive relation between art and 
technique, without giving proper indication as to how art and technique are 
meaningfully connected. I will begin to take up this challenge in the next section. 
 
IV.  DISCOVERY: THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC MUSIC PRODUCTION 
Our question is this: how can the kind of competence discussed in relation to 
technique turn into something like expression-proper? With respect to the intuitive 
difference between ‘reading’ and ‘feeling’ canvassed earlier, the question can be put 
by asking how such a transition from reading to feeling is possible. Here I suggest 
that an illuminating approach to understanding this issue is to focus on a more 
complex notion of ‘working out ideas’ in the medium which may exceed mere 
competence, and start to involve something like genuine expression. To provide a 
speculative sketch for such a notion I shall consider the more contemporary example 
of electronic music composition, in particular with a focus of the popular genre 
known as ‘electronica’. 
I should begin by explaining why I think the case of electronic music composition 
is particularly apt for our purposes. Firstly, such composition involves an overtly 
technical medium where, unlike the case of jazz, the range of possible technical 
interactions with the medium is greatly multiplied, giving the practitioner little hope 
of achieving anything without a fairly robust technical knowledge. Secondly, it is a 
particularly labour intensive medium to work with, where the final product is 
generated from a vast number of small additions, erasures and alterations. Moreover, 
the third key point is that such small interactions with the medium can often be 
described as ‘pre-conceived’. For example, one such interaction might be application 
of a filter to cut out unwanted frequencies when adding a new audible element to the 
work-in-progress, where this looks like the kind of purposive action relevant to craft 
and not art in Collingwood’s view. Indeed, engagement with the medium looks so 
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technical that one may question its viability (in Collingwoodian terms) for the 
expression of emotion in general. In spite of this worry, the last few decades have 
seen a great many innovative artists working in this medium whose artistic-products 
surely have expressive merit.16 Our question then becomes: how might this be 
possible on the basis of what prima facie looks like a craft on Collingwoodian terms? 
One kind of answer turns on the notion of ‘discovery’ within the technical space, 
or medium-oriented-structure as we previously labelled it, which is akin to the notion 
of improvisation that constituted genuine expression in the case of jazz. In particular, 
though the individual routine-like interactions with the work may be instrumental, 
there can often arise various unanticipated results, or ‘discoveries’, from such 
repeated interaction with the medium. From the point of view of the maker, these 
discoveries show up as kinds of micro-breakthrough in the medium, where they take 
on such a character precisely because they exceed the scope of what was considered 
possible within the technical structure. In particular, some of these micro-
breakthroughs might be conceived as microcosms of expression-proper, which serve 
to guide our future engagement with the medium.  
Though this sketch clearly needs to be worked out in more detail, it at least 
highlights how technique and expression might be meaningfully linked on an 
expressionist account such as Collingwood’s; namely, in such a way that expression 
emerges against the background of instrumentally understood structures which might, 
in turn, be further developed on the basis of unanticipated discoveries constitutive of 
expression within the medium. One challenging question for this development of the 
proposal, however, is exactly how those expressions constituted by certain micro-
breakthroughs in the medium can guide future engagement with that medium? Clearly 
such a guiding process cannot itself be instrumentally understood, else we are in 
danger once again of relapse into the technical theory of art. This also raises a broader 
question: how can expression, which is paradigmatic of purposive action without a 
means-ends structure, serve as norm to guide technique, which is paradigmatic of 
                                                 
16
  Though I take this ‘expressive merit’ as an assumption for the purposes of this paper, some 
pertinent examples to substantiate this claim (in the opinion of the author) might be: ‘Dayvan Cowboy’ 
by Boards Of Canada; ‘Tea Leaf Dancers’ by Flying Lotus; ‘My Angel Rocks Back And Forth’ by 
Fourtet; ‘Toys’ by Amon Tobin; ‘Iambic 5 Poetry’ by Squarepusher; ‘Air Song’ by Solar Fields; 
‘Kong’ by Bonobo; and ‘Childhood Montage (Title Sequence)’ by BT. There are of course many more. 
(All the examples given here were available to listen to online at http://www.youtube.com at the time 
of writing.) 
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action with a means-ends structure? Answering this question will move us to a better 
understanding of how art and technique might be substantively linked. 
Admittedly more needs to be done in assessing whether the notion of ‘discovery’ 
canvassed here is compatible with the notion of expression on a Collingwood/Ridley 
account; without such an assessment we may have reservations about positing the 
ideas developed in this section as a refinement of that account. On the other hand, 
given that the notion of discovery–which was constitutive of the beginnings of 
expression–necessarily exceeds the medium-oriented structures pertaining to 
technique, we may still maintain that expression is irreducible to technique, which 
makes the proposal prima facie compatible with the Collingwood/Ridley view. 
Supposing that such a compatibility can be justified, then the example of music 
production casts the nature of technique’s service to art in a clearer light: technique, 
and the medium-oriented structures associated with technique, provide a certain field 
of operation in which the practitioner instrumentally acts upon the medium, out of 
which (and perhaps only out of which) genuine expression may emerge. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have hoped to demonstrate that the basic conception of technique sketched above is 
broadly compatible with the Collingwood/Ridley account, and that it overcomes the 
danger of rendering technique impotent to provide any service to art on such an 
account. Indeed, the rumination on practice within music production seems to indicate 
that technique supplies a vital service in providing the context out of which certain 
‘expressive’ discoveries within the medium can be made; where, more precisely, this 
context is equated with some technically construed field in which the artist can 
operate, against which the discoveries show up as unanticipated results. This view is a 
development of the proposal related to the jazz standard, which pointed more 
generally to the idea that technique involves some context which facilitates expression 
itself. Although our project was to connect instrumentally conceived features of 
artistic production–i.e., those involving technique–to artistic expression itself, it was 
of course crucial that we avoided the claim that technique is a sufficient condition to 
artistic-production (which involves genuine expression); else we relapse into the so-
called technical theory of art which is incompatible with the Collingwood/Ridley 
position. However, as I understand it, the Collingwood/Ridley account is perfectly 
compatible with the claim that technique is a necessary condition to the artwork, 
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making it in principle amenable to our proposed refinement of the conception of 
technique. If this proposal downplayed Ridley’s demarcation of technique into the so-
called craft-aspect of the object, it hopefully developed his key observation that 
Collingwood’s account is rich enough to accommodate technique. Indeed, the 
proposal here suggests that, far from debarring technique, Collingwood’s account is 
fruitfully approached via the concept of technique, which may provide a route to 
better understanding his notion of expression itself. 
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